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Women in Social and Economic Research 
 
Women in Social and Economic Research (WiSER) is a research program that spans 
two divisions of Curtin University: the Curtin Business School (CBS) and the 
Division of Humanities. WiSER was founded in April 1999 in response to a growing 
void, both within the Australian and international contexts, in the gendered analysis 
of the economic and social policy issues that confront women. As such, WiSER is 
committed to producing high quality quantitative and qualitative research on a broad 
range of issues which women identify as impeding their ability to achieve equity and 
autonomy. The gender perspective generated through the work of WiSER has 
provided a number of key opportunities to inform the policy debates within 
numerous government departments. WiSER seeks to further its commitment to 
providing a meaningful gender analysis of policy through pursuing further research 
opportunities which focus on women’s experiences of social and economic policies 
within the Australian context. The broad objectives of WiSER include: 
 
• To identify the cases and causes of women’s disadvantaged social and 
economic status and to contribute to appropriate policy initiatives to address 
this disadvantage; 
• To demonstrate the way in which social factors, particularly gender, influence 
the construction of economic theory and policy; 
• To extend current theory and research by placing women and their social 
context at the centre of analysis; 
• To contribute an interdisciplinary approach to the understanding of women’s 
position in society. In turn, this should enable the unit to better reflect the 
interrelatedness of the social, economic and political discourses in policy and 
their consequent implications for women;  
• To foster feminist research both nationally and internationally; 
• To expand linkages with industry; 
• To establish and support a thriving Curtin University of Technology post-
























This paper examines changes to the setting of minimum employment conditions 
under the WorkChoices 2006 (Cth) legislation and considers the availability of data to 
adequately assess their effects on women’s earnings. It identifies the need for shared 
understandings of the ways that existing Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
earnings data can be used to examine women’s earnings under the WorkChoices 
regulatory regime. In order to explore the issue of shared understandings of data 
this paper will compare the earnings estimates reported in reports of the Office of 
the Employment Advocate (OEA) with unpublished ABS data relating to earnings. 
The need to disaggregate earnings by gender and occupation is demonstrated 
throughout the paper. It is concluded that earnings estimates for those on AWAs 
show that individual agreements give rise to winners and losers. There are specific 
areas of concern for those interested in gender equity within the labour market. 
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1 Introduction 
Much of the rhetoric surrounding the introduction of the Australian Governments 
so-called WorkChoices legislation speaks in terms of the opportunity to negotiate 
employment arrangements that are tailored to the local conditions. More specifically, 
the centrepiece of the WorkChoices legislation is the ability of individual workers to 
be able to negotiate “flexible” terms and conditions of employment with their 
employers (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2004/05).  
WorkChoices specifically seeks to move the industrial landscape further away from 
the traditional Australian modes of industrial relations based on dispute resolution 
and centralised forms of conciliation and arbitration.  Since the late 1980s and in 
particular since 1996, the role of centralised arbitration commission, the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) has been reduced. At the same time, 
collective bargaining through union bodies has been diminished by restrictions on 
union input, declining union membership and the growth (albeit slow) of alternatives 
such as individual workplace agreements.  WorkChoices moves this process further by 
reducing the powers of the AIRC to set wages and conditions, reducing the scope of 
those matters which can be included in industrial awards and promoting individual 
negotiation of workplace terms and conditions.  What this means in practice is yet 
to be fully realised.  However, it is apparent that in addition to any assumed 
opportunities, the new provisions are likely to generate a range of challenges for 
both those directly affected by the new regulations and those who attempt to 
monitor their effects. In this paper we focus on the latter, with special reference to 
the challenges faced by those who attempt to monitor the gendered nature of the 
effects of the WorkChoices legislation on employment related earnings, particularly 
amongst those on relatively low or minimum wages. 
 
We focus on minimum wages because the new mechanisms for establishing minimum 
employment conditions are a key area of change under the new regulations.  While 
“award only” provisions have traditionally defined minimum employment conditions, 
they have also effectively provided standard employment conditions for large sectors 
of the workforce, particularly those which have high proportions of women 
employees. The WorkChoices provisions operate to alter the process by which 
minimum employment entitlements are established. Most notably, the Australian Fair 
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Pay Commission (AFPC) is now responsible for five key conditions of employment 
defined under the legislation as: basic rates of pay and casual loadings; maximum 
ordinary hours of work; annual leave; personal leave; and parental leave and related 
entitlements. The official literature on WorkChoices tells us that these conditions are 
to be supplemented by employment agreements negotiated at the workplace or 
individual level. Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) have a relatively 
privileged role to play in this part of the new workplace regulatory regime (The 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia 2004/05).  
 
In the absence of meaningful information through the award system, there will be a 
need for data that can be used to monitor changes in the “minimum conditions” 
sectors of the labour market. However, relevant data are both fragmented and 
partial (Preston, Jefferson & Seymour 2006). As a result, monitoring the effects of 
new regulations on “minimum conditions” sectors or specific occupations will pose 
several challenges. The aim of this paper is to review existing reporting arrangements 
on wages specified in Australian Workplace Agreements and to identify the 
advantages and disadvantages of specific forms of earnings data from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics. 
 
The paper is divided into four parts.  The first part sets out a brief history of the 
manner in which wages have been set in Australia through the centralised wage fixing 
system of National Wage Cases by the AIRC.  The second part considers the role of 
the newly formed Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) and discuss as how this 
will effect wage determinations in the future.  The third part will consider earnings 
data by gender and occupation, comparing different estimates from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA). Finally 
the paper will consider the outcomes of the data analysis and how WorkChoices 
might impact on future earnings patterns.  
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2 A Brief History of Australian Industrial Relations 
Arbitration is a well known process in the Australian industrial relations landscape. 
Unlike most other mixed economies Australia, like New Zealand adopted a process 
in the early part of the 20th century which explicitly recognised and addressed 
inequalities between industrial stakeholders.  The industrial arbitration process 
involves, at its most basic, the ability of an independent tribunal to be able to impose 
a decision, determination or award upon the parties to an industrial dispute. That 
decision, determination or award may be imposed whether or not the parties would 
have reached that outcome themselves.  Both State and Federal tribunals have 
usually been guided by statutory provisions which promote informality in 
procedures, fair outcomes based on consideration of prevailing economic and 
workplace conditions and which have invited a collective rather than individual 
approach to fixing terms and conditions of employment.  The positive outcomes of 
this approach have been a considerable degree of uniformity in terms and conditions 
across particular industries and protection of the more vulnerable in the community, 
who regardless of their industrial strength could seek recourse from an impartial 
tribunal.  In this sense arbitration is the antithesis of a negotiated settlement.  
Negotiated settlements invite parties to reach settlement of dispute through 
informal processes without recourse to determinative powers.  As such the 
outcomes are influenced by the relative power of the parties to the dispute.  
Traditionally, the relative strength of employers (based on their power to hire and 
fire) has been offset to some extent by the collective power of unions.  It should be 
pointed out however, that the Australian industrial arbitration system has almost 
always been combined with pre-arbitration processes such as conciliation and 
negotiation which in many cases has reduced the need for industrial tribunals to 
impose awards by arbitration.  In practice, up until the introduction of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1993 (Cth) the predecessor of the current Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(Cth) many awards were made by consent; the product of negotiation by unions and 
employer groups. In effect the AIRC has played an active role not only as an 
arbitrator of disputes but also a facilitator of agreements. 
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2.1 Wage Fixing under the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission 
The AIRC and its predecessors (the Commission) have in the past had a significant 
role in setting minimum working standards that it considered the community should 
accept. Awards made by industrial tribunals have developed into comprehensive 
statements of conditions which include wages, working conditions, hours of work, 
holidays as well as procedures for termination of employment, probation and 
promotion or advancement.  This was often referred to as a “floor” of rights.  In 
many societies this floor of rights is put in place by legislation.  While legislation can 
only be changed by Government, awards can be altered by an industrial tribunal on a 
more frequent basis depending on the nature of the cases which it determines.  
Allowing the floor of rights to be set by an independent tribunal removes it from 
political influence. 
 
One of the major functions of the Commission was to conduct the National Wage 
Case (NWC).  The NWC was generally been held annually although there were 
periods when wages were adjusted quarterly and six monthly.  To commence the 
NWC the Commission considered the entire award structure not simply wages.  
This was done in context of an “industrial dispute” because until recently the making 
of an award is premised constitutionally on an industrial dispute.  The Commission 
contrived this “dispute” by inviting the representative organisations of labour and 
management to seek a variation to significant national awards.  As the parties would 
invariably not agree as the terms of the variation the Commission had jurisdiction to 
deal with NWC dispute. This somewhat unwieldy but nevertheless effective process 
had been in place since 1907 when the first basic wage concept was created by the 
Arbitration Court in the historic Harvester decision.  Importantly, that early decision 
determined that wages should be paid at a level which would allow workers to live in 
“frugal” comfort. While largely neglecting the situation of women workers, the 
process notably determined wages having regard to the reasonable costs of living 
rather than the ability of the worker to negotiate.  During the depression of the 
1930’s the Commission increasingly took into account the ability of industry to pay 
wage increases.  In the 1950s other economic aspects were considered by the 
Commission, including production and productivity, employment and investment, 
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external trade and balances; the competitive position of secondary industry and 
related trade conditions.   
 
By 1961 the Commission had adopted national productivity as a major determinant 
of wage increases.  At about the same time the formal annual NWC was adopted.  In 
time the Commission also adopted the practice of reviewing the basic wage and any 
margin (or additional payment) for skills doing this by consideration of the Metal 
Trades Award, using this as a benchmark to vary other awards.  In 1967 the 
Commission abandoned the basis wage and margins adjustment for a ‘total wage’ 
adjustment process which allowed it to establish a minimum wage.   
 
In addition to the NWC the Commission adjusted wages by periodic work value 
inquiries which involved the Commission in assessments of the relative value of work 
as against other jobs.  Such a process tended to advantage those with greatest 
industrial bargaining strength and possibly contributed to gaps between men and 
women’s wages Gender earnings gaps were formally recognised in the early 1970s 
when the Commission was required to make awards which provided payment of 
wages for work of equal value. At least notionally, this approach required the 
Commission to attempt to provide some parity in wages.  In 1993 the Federal Labor 
Government legislated to introduce the requirement that awards provide for 
payment of wages based on this principle.  The Government also introduced 
provisions to allow for negotiation of enterprise based agreements outside of the 
award system.  At around the same time award determinations became safety nets 
for workers as enterprise bargaining began to produce new wage rates.   Enterprise 
negotiations in the early 1990’s were still primarily the outcome of collective 
bargaining via unions and employer groups.  From 1996 onwards with the enactment 
of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) the range of matters which could be 
arbitrated by the AIRC was reduced to 20 allowable matters, forcing parties to 
negotiate outside of the award system for those terms and conditions which were 
not covered as allowable matters.  Notably most awards ceased to deal with 
constraints on the employment of casual and part-time workers.  Australia has very 
high levels of casual, temporary and part-time workers compared with other OECD 
countries.  Research indicates the growth of this form of employment has effects on 
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gender equality and skills development (Campbell & Burgess 2001; Pocock, Buchanan 
& Campbell 2004).   
 
The importance of the NWC has been that the process of wages fixing has been 
public and transparent.  Each year, for many years, the major industrial 
representatives were invited to make submissions on the variation of major 
industrial awards as a benchmark for the adjustment of other awards.  The 
Commission hearings were open to the public and attracted national media 
attention.  The submissions of the parties were public, witnessed were called to 
support submissions and the final determination of the Commission was also made 
public.  Over time as has been noted the Commission evolved various wage setting 
principles and developed guidelines for enterprise bargaining.  Finally and 
importantly, most State wage systems were aligned with the NWC so that whenever 
the Commission made a determination under the NWC the effects would flow-on 
throughout the State systems.  As a consequence of the WorkChoices amendments 
to the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) the NWC system has been abolished and 
replaced by the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standards (AFPCS) which will be 
overseen by the Australian Fair Pay Commission. 
 
2.2 Some Preliminary Issues in relation to WorkChoices 
Before addressing the likely processes of the AFPC it is important to deal with three 
preliminary issues.  First, WorkChoices abolishes the no-disadvantage test.  The no-
disadvantage test was introduced in 1993 with the passage of the Industrial Relations 
Act 1993 (Cth) and was retained in the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) until 2006 
with the introduction of WorkChoices.  The essence of the test is that workers who 
step outside the award system because they have become a party to a registered 
collective agreement or an individual agreement retain the award as a safety net.  
That is, on balance a worker outside of the award system should not be worse off 
than those who continue under the comparator award.  Although the test was not 
absolutely infallible it did provide a level of protection for workers, particularly the 
more vulnerable who might not have been members of unions.  WorkChoices allows 
for agreements to be made which reduce or do away with award or statutory 
entitlements.  A worker who seeks to protect award conditions must ensure that 
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their agreement does not specifically nullify preserved conditions under State awards 
or protected notional conditions under State or Territory statutes.  Many individuals 
may not be aware of the need to protect these rights. 
 
Second, WorkChoices introduces the concept of the Australian Fair Pay and 
Conditions Standard.  The AFPCS covers wages, ordinary hours of work and annual, 
personal and parental leave.  These minimum standards will apply to almost all 
workers regardless of their form of employment and can only be displaced by more 
favourable provisions.  However, up to two weeks of annual leave may be ‘cashed 
out’, a provision that appears most to arise in the context of individual workplace 
agreements (AWAs. Most current individual agreements do not contain provision 
for wage increases during the term of the agreement, so that the ability to cash out 
annual leave may be used as a mechanism to obtain a wage increase.  An allied 
concept under the previous section 170VPA (1) (e) of the Workplace Relations Act 
1996 (Cth) obliged an employer to offer similar employment provisions to 
employees doing the same work unless a distinction was made on reasonable 
grounds.  This requirement no longer appears under WorkChoices so that there is 
greater potential for discrimination between workers doing similar work – thus 
putting in peril the concept of equal pay for work of equal value. 
 
A third point to make about WorkChoices is that it focuses on AWAs as the primary 
vehicle for negotiation of terms and conditions of employment.  This focus has been 
achieved in a number of ways and includes reduction union power by a general 
exclusion of unions from negotiations, reduction in the scope of the jurisdiction of 
the AIRC to arbitrate matters and removal of the no-disadvantage test which makes 
AWAs more attractive to employers particularly in non-union workplaces. 
 
2.3 The Australian Fair Pay Commission 
The AFPC has the responsibility of adjusting the Australian Pay and Classification 
Scale or the Federal Minimum Wage (FMW). The general objective of the AFPC 
under section 23 is to promote economic prosperity and provide a safety net for the 
low paid. However, a new objective has been introduced: ‘the capacity for the 
unemployed and low paid to obtain and remain in employment’.  There is not 
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requirement (as applied to the AIRC) to consider a fair and reasonable wage having 
regard for the living standards generally prevailing in the Australian community. The 
absence of a requirement to consider fairness coupled with the direction to consider 
whether wages are keeping others out of the workforce may remove or reduce the 
focus on ensuring that workers are provided with a wage which allows them to live 
with decency (Riley and Sarina 2006:344-345). The AFPC must however, under 
section 222, apply the principle that men and women should be receive equal 
remuneration for work of equal value, although as noted the requirement to disclose 
reasons for offering differential payments under AWAs has been removed.  It is 
possible that the AFPC may focus on the Federal Minimum Wage (FMW) rather than 
the Australian Pay and Classification Scale.  The FMW is set at $12.75 by 
WorkChoices.  This would mean that in time the minimum wage could encapsulate 
most award rates and create a single standard for lower paid workers in the federal 
system.  The AFPC can also adjust special FMW’s that apply to employees who are 
juniors, or have a disability or are undertaking traineeships.  The AFPC can also 
adjust the default casual loading set under WorkChoices as 20%.  Sections 187, 196 
and 214 of the legislation require that the wages of employees do not fall below 
those rates to which they were entitled immediately prior the introduction of the 
legislation.   There is no statutory guarantee that wages will rise. 
 
Unlike the AIRC which consisted of officers appointed for life, the AFPC consists of 
a chair and four Commissioners with limited term appointments.  Under section 24 
the AFPC can inform itself as it sees fit and commission research and can consult 
with other bodies to monitor wage decisions.  This may allow it to obtain reliable 
data, a problem which the AIRC noted. The AFPC can determine the timing 
frequency and scope of wage reviews and the manner in which they are conducted.  
The AFPC must present its decision without dissent, which must be in writing and 
must express its wage decisions in terms of amounts per hour and nominate when 
its decisions come into effect.  As noted the AIRC was dependent on the 
submissions of the parties when hearing the NWC.  However the AIRC was 
independent of government, whereas due to the limited term of office of the AFPC 
there is a perception it may be subject to political influences. 
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Significantly, while ordinary hours of work are set at a maximum of 38 hours a week, 
these may be averaged over an agreed period of up to a year.  Employees may be 
required to work additional reasonable hours, although there is no statutory 
requirement to pay over-time.   
 
2.4 Australian Workplace Agreements 
WorkChoices provides that individual workplace agreements can be reached between 
workers and their employer and registered with the Office of Employment Advocate 
(OEA).  When first introduced the AWA was novel to the Australian industrial 
landscape because it allowed the parties to contract out of the award system and 
unions did not generally speaking have any institutionalised role in the negotiation of 
such agreements.  Until the introduction of the WorkChoices AWAs were subject 
to the no-disadvantage test.  Some commentators assert that AWAs are not part of 
any bargaining process because usually the employer unilaterally determines 
employment conditions which are offered on a take it or leave it basis.(Owens and 
Riley 2006; 495 citing Mitchell).  This is particularly the case under sections 329 and 
330 with so-called greenfields agreements which allow and employer who is starting 
up a new business to enter into an agreement with themselves – that is, without any 
opposing party being part of the negations.  Such agreements can operate for 12 
months.  
 
The OEA plays a role as the registry of AWAs but does not vet the agreements in 
relation to wage levels. It does play some role in removing any prohibited content 
from agreements, although this is by no means comprehensive (Senate Employment 
2006).  Prohibited content relates to any clauses which support union influence in 
the workplace; provide remedies for unfair dismissal; are discriminatory or are 
matters which do not pertain to the employment relationships such as provisions 
which require an employer to pay unions fees from wages.    
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3 Gender Equity and Workplace Regulation 
The recent regulatory changes are particularly relevant to those with an interest in 
gender equity within the workforce for several specific reasons. They will play an 
important role in key aspects of Australia’s legal requirements to ensure gender 
equity within the workplace. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW: to which Australia is a party and which is 
scheduled to the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984) highlights that the right 
to work and right to equal opportunities in employment, the right to equal 
remuneration and the right to promotion, job security, training and other benefits 
and conditions of employment are key elements of equality between men and 
women. There are also a number of national legislative and international legal 
obligations that require Australia to further the goal of equity in employment1. 
 
Gender equity obligations are recognised as some of the Principle Objects of the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth), which include “assisting in giving effect to 
Australia’s international obligations in relation to labour standards”; “assisting 
employees to balance their work and family responsibilities effectively through the 
development of mutually beneficial work practices with employers”; and “respecting 
and valuing the diversity of the work force by helping to prevent and eliminate 
discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, sexual preference, age, physical or 
mental disability, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political 
opinion, national extraction or social origin” (Section 3, (l) (m) (n)). 
 
At the same, however, a range of studies have demonstrated important links 
between the size of the gender pay gap and prevailing employment bargaining 
arrangements. Generally, centralised wage determination systems have been 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Jo Tilley from the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity for her advice on relevant 
international conventions. The following national legislation and international legal obligations require 
Australia to further equity in employment: the Workplace Relations Act 1996, the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act 1986, CEDAW, the  International Labour 
Organization (ILO) Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration for Work of Equal Value, the ILO 
Convention 111 Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, the ILO Equal 
Remuneration Recommendation 90, the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) 
Recommendation 111, and the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights. The 
ILO Convention 156 concerning Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment for Men and Women 
Workers: Workers with Family Responsibilities, further seeks to create equality of opportunity between 
men and women workers with family responsibilities, and between men and women with such 
responsibilities and workers without such responsibilities. 
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associated with smaller gender wage gaps (Blau and Kahn, 1992, Gregory and Daly, 
1992, Gregory and Ho, 1985, Rubery, 1992, Whitehouse, 1992). That is, centralised 
wage fixing processes appear to be important in providing minimum conditions for 
those in relatively weak bargaining positions.2 Women hold fewer positions of power 
and are lower paid than men and have fewer financial resources (Astor and Chinkin, 
1992:109).  Women are also less unionised than men are and, it has been argued 
that this has facilitated lower levels of access to one means of support and advocacy 
(Lee, 1994). There is evidence that the increasing trend in Australia towards 
individual employment contracts away from industry-based awards and collective 
agreements particularly disadvantages specific groups of women (Lee and Sheldon, 
1997).  
 
4 Monitoring Earnings and Gender Equity Under 
AWAs 
Under section 358A of the Workplace Agreements Act 1996 (Cth), the OEA is 
required by legislation to present biennial reports to parliament on developments in 
bargaining for the making of agreements. The reporting function is carried out jointly 
by the Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR), which 
reports on collective agreements and the OEA, who reports on Australian 
Workplace Agreements. Perhaps surprisingly, the OEA does not collect wage 
information directly from AWAs for reporting purposes. Their most recent report, 
Agreement Making in Australia Under the Workplace Relations Act (DEWR and OEA, 
2004) uses ABS data from catalogue 6306.0 for the purpose of reporting average 
wage rates under AWAs and other forms of employment agreement. Although 
produced only every two years, the ABS publication Employee Earnings and Hours 
6306.0 may play an increasingly important role in this regard. It is a key data source 
that provides estimates of the average earnings, both total and ordinary time, for 
employees on different forms of employment contract, including AWAs.  
 
Information about earnings under AWAs contained in the Agreement Making report 
occurs at two main points. Information for all employees is included in section 3.1 
                                                 
2 An exception to this rule appears to occur when changes in institutional arrangements lead men’s 
wages to decline and thus result in an apparent drop in gender earnings gaps (Preston 2003). 
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(pages 83-84) while earnings information for “designated groups” of employees 
(women, part-timers, youth and people from non-English speaking backgrounds) is 
contained in section 3.3. The earnings estimates used by the OEA are presented in a 
highly aggregated form and, as we discuss below, do not facilitate scrutiny of 
differences between different labour market sectors. This can be demonstrated by 
examining the OEA’s use of unpublished data that gives average wage rates for 
different occupational groups at the ASCO one digit level. In the following discussion 
we focus on the OEA’s reporting of information for “all employees” and for women 
as a designated group.  
 
The ABS estimates reported by the OEA make some significant claims, among which 
is the statement that “most groups of non-managerial employees on AWAs …had 
higher earnings than employees on federal CAs [collective agreements]. Intermediate 
and elementary clerical, sales and service workers, advanced clerical and service 
workers and associate professionals on AWAs earned more on average than 
equivalent employees on federal CAs.” The unpublished ABS data to support this 
claim is reproduced below as Table 1. 
 







All pay setting 
methods ($) 
Professionals 29.10 31.70 30.00 
Associate professionals 26.70 35.50 31.50 
Tradespersons and related workers 23.70 21.90 20.30 
Advanced clerical and service 
workers 
22.70 26.00 21.40 
Intermediate clerical, sales and 
service workers 
19.20 20.20 18.60 
Intermediate production and 
transport workers 
21.50 21.00 20.20 
Elementary clerical, sales and 
service workers 
15.20 17.60 15.30 
Labourers and related workers 18.60 16.20 16.60 
All occupations 23.40 30.20 24.60 
Source: (DEWR and OEA, 2004: Table 3.1.6, page 84) 
 
 
There are several points about these estimates worth noting. Firstly, an estimated 
two per cent of employees were employed under individual registered agreements in 
May 2002 (ABS 6306.0, table 22. page 43). While this may be expected to increase in 
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coming months and years, the above wage rates apply to a relatively small 
proportion of employees. Secondly, there appear to be some differences between 
the OEA’s definition of “non-managerial employees” and that used by the ABS. In the 
above table, the reference to non-managerial employees appears to mean that 
employees included in ASCO code 1, “Managerial and administrative employees” 
have been omitted from the table. The ABS use of the term non-managerial 
employees differs from this approach. According to ABS Catalogue 6306.0: 
“employees have been classified as managerial if they have strategic responsibilities in 
the conduct or operations of the organisation and /or were in charge of significant 
numbers of employees”. As a result of this approach, the ABS warns that: 
Care should be taken when comparing survey estimates based on ASCO 
groups with estimates based on the managerial status of employees. Estimates 
for employees with managerial status include employees classified to ASCO 
categories other than the ASCO major group “Managers and administrators”; 
eg employees classified as “Professionals” according to ASCO may be 
categorised by employers as having managerial status. Conversely, tables in 
this publication which contained estimates for non-managerial employees (as 
defined by employers) will include some employees who would be classified 
to the ASCO major group Managers and administrators. (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, 2004:44) 
In this paper we are concerned with the availability of wage data for those who have 
traditionally been employed on minimum provisions. Therefore, we have used data 
that excludes managerial employees who have not traditionally been employed on an 
award basis but on some form of above minimum, individual contract. 
 
Thirdly, the wage rates referred to in the above table are those for 2002. This is 
because there is a considerably time lag in the preparation of reports. Thus, the 
OEA’s report covering the 2002/03 was released in 2004. At that stage the most 
recently available ABS estimates were those for 2002. Presumably, the next report, 
covering 2004/05, will use ABS 2004 estimates. The 2004 estimates are, however, 
already available directly from the ABS and we have purchased unpublished wage 
estimates for the purposes of comparison in this paper. 
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Table 2, below, utilises the same format as that used by the OEA (2004) but includes 
average wage estimates for employees who fit within the ABS definition of “non-
managerial employee”. It also includes the corresponding estimates from the latest, 
2004, survey. There are two key points of interest. Firstly, for two of the 
occupational classifications which appear to have relatively favourable hourly wages 
in 2002, (associate professionals and intermediate clerical, sales and service 
workers), the difference between AWAs and collective agreements is reduced when 
managerial employees are removed from the estimates. This is particularly the case 
for associate professionals, where hourly earnings estimates were reduced from 
$35.50 (Table 1) to $31.40 (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Average hourly total earnings by occupation and type of agreement for non-
managerial employees, May 2002 and 2004 








All pay setting 
methods ($) 
 2002 2004 2002 2004 2002 2004 
Professionals 28.60 29.30 31.00 34.20 27.90 29.60 
Associate professionals 25.20 26.30 31.40 29.30 24.60 25.10 
Tradespersons and related workers 23.70 25.60 21.90 21.70 19.00 20.80 
Advanced clerical and service 
workers 
22.70 24.60 26.00 24.90 19.60 22.00 
Intermediate clerical, sales and 
service workers 
19.20 20.40 19.70 19.40 17.90 19.10 
Intermediate production and 
transport workers 
21.50 22.10 21.00 24.80 19.50 20.60 
Elementary clerical, sales and 
service workers 
15.20 16.60 17.60 16.20 15.20 16.20 
Labourers and related workers 18.60 19.40 16.20 16.60 16.30 17.60 
All occupations 22.10 23.40 24.80 23.20 20.40 22.00 
Source: ABS unpublished data Catalogue 6306.0 
 
Secondly, for five of the eight occupational groups, average earnings estimates for 
those on AWAs are lower in 2004 than they were in 2002. As an OEA report using 
2004 estimates has not yet been released, there is currently no explanation offered 
as to why this may be occurring. We return to this aspect of the estimates later in 
our discussion. 
 
As noted previously, women comprise one of the “designated groups” included in 
the OEA. Two tables that comprise significant parts of the OEA’s gender analysis 
have been combined to produce Table 3 below:  
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Table 3: Female earnings by type of agreement 2002 
 Total weekly 
earnings ($) 
Total hourly earnings ($) 
 Female Female Male 
Federal registered collective agreement 600.40 21.30 25.00 
Federal registered individual agreement 
(AWA) 
889.20 28.10 31.50 
State registered collective agreement 664.70 24.10 26.60 
State registered individual agreement 420.70 16.70 22.90 
Other 506.90 20.20 28.90 
All female employees 554.00 21.10 27.50 
Source: DEWR/OEA 2004 Table 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 page 99 
 
 
The estimates included in Table 3 are used by the OEA to support two key claims. 
Firstly, the weekly wage rates are used to claim that “female employees on AWAs 
earned 32 per cent or more than counterparts on CAs”. Secondly, the hourly wage 
rates are used to support the statement that “female AWA employees earned 89 
per cent of the male AWA employee hourly rate of pay. This compared to a female-
male earnings ration of 85 per cent for employees on federal registered collective 
agreements, and 77 per cent for all employees. 
 
4.1 Comparing OEA Reports with ABS Unpublished Data 
In Table 4 we have used non-managerial hourly wage rate estimates to assess these 
claims. We have not used weekly earnings estimates as they include both part-time 
and full-time employees. The relatively high percentage of AWA employees who 
work full-time compared to other wage setting mechanisms, reduces the capacity of 
these estimates to provide meaningful comparisons. Again, we have also included 
estimates from the more recent 2004 ABS survey of employees’ hours and earnings. 
 
Table 4: Non-managerial Female and Male total hourly earnings by type of agreement 
May 2002 and May 2004 
 Total hourly earnings 
($) 2002 
Total hourly earnings 
($) 2004 
Type of agreement Female Male Female Male 
Federal registered collective agreement 20.40 23.40 21.70 24.80 
Federal registered individual agreement 
(AWA) 
24.70 24.90 19.90 25.00 
State registered collective agreement 22.70 24.60 23.80 25.70 
State registered individual agreement 14.70 21.80 26.40 33.50 
Other 17.50 19.80 19.10 21.60 
All female employees 19.10 21.50 20.70 23.20 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
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Using these estimates, women on AWAs in 2002 earn approximately 21 per cent 
more that women on federal collective agreements, rather than the 32 per cent 
reported above. Women on AWAs were, however, earning relatively favourable 
rates of pay and for non-managerial employees on AWAs in 2002 there is almost no 
gender gap. However, by 2004, the gender gap for those on AWAs is wider than for 
all other forms of agreement except individual state agreements. Further, by 2004 
women on AWAs appear to have lost much of their advantage in terms of hourly 
earnings compared with women employed under alternative wage setting 
mechanisms. A comparison of the estimates from both 2002 and 2004 suggests that 
AWAs may operate quite differently in feminised sectors of the workforce, an aspect 
we investigate more fully by considering different occupational groups in more detail 
below.  
 
4.2 Comparing estimates across occupational groups 
Before moving to a discussion of different occupational groups, it is worth noting 
that an interesting aspect of the above estimates relates to individual agreements at 
the State level. These varied markedly, with large increases in hourly earnings 
estimates occurring between 2002 and 2004. While this is not a subject for analysis 
in this article, it appears related to the growing use of state-based individual 
agreements in the mining industry, particularly in Western Australia. When 
disaggregated data is used, there is a lack of reliable earnings estimates for state 
registered individual agreements and this area of the ABS data has a large proportion 
of empty cells. Individual State agreements are largely omitted from the remaining 
analysis. 
 
For most of the following discussion we examine hourly ordinary time earnings 
estimates for non-managerial employees in each major occupational group at the 
ASCO one digit level. We focus on hourly earnings because this prevents the 
anomalous situation of comparing average weekly earnings for categories of 
employee comprised of different proportions of part-time and full-time workers. We 
have used ordinary time earnings to prevent comparisons being affected by possible 
changes in the patterns of working hours, for example, increased earnings due to 
additional overtime hours. 
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There is a key exception to the approach outlined above and this relates to the 
occupational classification of Managers and Administrators. For this occupational 
group we include managerial employees and due to the lack of statistical reliability of 
hourly wage estimates, use weekly ordinary time earnings estimates. On the 
assumption that most managers and administrators are likely to be full-time 
employees, the use of weekly earnings estimates appear unlikely to cause the same 
challenges posed by other occupational groups.  
4.2.1 ASCO Occupational Group 1: Managers and administrators  
Table 5 and Figure 1 present previously unpublished estimates for earnings 
disaggregated by major occupational group, in this case for managers and 
administrators. The estimates demonstrate that women in this occupational grouping 
have done relatively well under AWAs, with higher weekly earnings than other 
women and relatively favourable increases in weekly earnings between 2002 and 
2004. The relativity between women’s and men’s earnings remained almost steady – 
84 per cent in 2002 and 85 per cent in 2004. 
 
Table 5: Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings($) for Female and Male Managerial 
and Administrative Employees, May 2002 and May 2004 
 Females Males Female earnings 
as % of male 
Type of 
Agreement 
2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 % 2004% 
Federal Collective 1,315.70 1,332.80 1,504.90 1,676.60 87 79 
State Collective 1,299.10 1,343.50 1,371.30 1,651.10 95 81 
Federal Individual 1,396.20 1,682.60 1,669.60 1,991.10 84 85 
Other 1,084.70 1,276.70 1,511.20 1,531.60 72 83 
Total 1,151.90 1,303.00 1,504.70 1,573.70 77 83 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
Notes: “Other” estimates for 2002 exclude some employees on individual state agreements. 
 
 
Figure 1: Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings($) for Female and Male Managerial 
and Administrative Employees, May 2002 and May 2004 






















































Notes: State Individual Agreements have been omitted from this analysis due to the number of 
missing cells in that data. ‘f’ denotes female earnings under each type of employment agreement and 
‘m’ denotes male earnings. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
4.2.2 ASCO Group 2: Professionals 
As noted above, estimates from this point on refer to hourly ordinary time earnings 
among non-managerial employees. Amongst professional employees, women on 
AWAs in 2002 had relatively favourable hourly earnings and a slightly lower gender 
earnings gap compared with federal collective and other forms of agreement. 
However, by 2004 this position had eroded. AWA women’s average hourly earnings 
had dropped from $29.40 to $28.60 and the gender gap between AWA men and 
women was larger than that for other types of agreement. In 2004, women on 
AWAs were estimated to earn 78 per cent of the hourly earnings of males on 
AWAs. 
 
Table 6: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 
Managerial Professional Employees, May 2002 and May 2004 
 Females Males Female earnings 
as % of male 
Type of 
Agreement 
2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 % 2004% 2002 % 2004% 
Federal Collective 26.90 27.20 30.80 32.20 87 84 
State Collective 27.40 28.40 29.60 31.60 93 90 
Federal Individual 29.40 28.60 32.60 36.50 90 78 
Other 24.90 26.90 28.60 32.00 87 84 
Total 26.30 27.50 29.50 32.10 89 86 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
Notes: “Other” estimates for 2002 exclude some employees on individual state agreements 
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Figure 2: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 
























































Notes: State Individual Agreements have been omitted from this analysis due to the number of 
missing cells in that data. ‘f’ denotes female earnings under each type of employment agreement and 
‘m’ denotes male earnings. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
 
4.2.3 ASCO Group 3: Associate professionals 
Women on AWAs in 2002 received highly favourable earnings compared with those 
on other types of employment agreement, earning about 35 per cent more than 
average earnings for women in this occupational group and 90 per cent of male 
earnings. This position had eroded significantly by 2004, with absolute earnings for 
women on AWAs dropping by over five dollars an hour and AWA women’s earnings 
estimated at just 72 per cent of men’s. Men on AWAs appear to have maintained 
their relatively favourable earnings position compared with employees on other 
forms of agreement. 
 
Table 7: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), Female and Male Non Managerial 
Associate Professional Employees, May 2002 and May 2004 
 Females Males Female earnings 
as % of male 
Type of 
Agreement 
2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 % 2004% 2002% 2004% 
Federal Collective 22.80 23.40 26.10 28.40 87 82 
State Collective 22.20 23.50 27.20 28.70 82 82 
Federal Individual 29.20 23.90 32.60 33.30 90 72 
Other 20.40 21.40 26.10 25.40 78 84 
Total 21.50 22.40 26.50 27.10 81 83 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
Notes: “Other” estimates for 2002 exclude some employees on individual state agreements 
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Figure 3: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), Female and Male Non Managerial 























































Notes: State Individual Agreements have been omitted from this analysis due to the number of 
missing cells in that data. ‘f’ denotes female earnings under each type of employment agreement and 
‘m’ denotes male earnings. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
 
4.2.4 ASCO Group 4: Tradespersons and related workers 
Women in this category have fared quite poorly under AWAs. In 2002, women on 
AWAs were paid less than their counterparts on collective registered agreements 
and between 2002 and 2004, women on both AWAs and on state collective 
agreements have experienced a decline in average earnings. Both women and men 
on AWAs recorded declines in estimated hourly earnings between 2002 and 2004. 
Further, AWA women’s earnings relative to men’s dropped from 69 per cent to 67 
per cent between 2002 and 2004. 
 
Table 8: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 
Managerial Tradespersons and Related Workers, May 2002 and May 2004 
 Females Males Female earnings 
as % of male 
Type of 
Agreement 
2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002% 2004% 
Federal Collective 19.80 20.20 22.70 24.30 87 83 
State Collective 18.70 15.40 22.40 22.50 83 68 
Federal Individual 15.10 14.30 21.90 21.40 69 67 
Other 14.20 15.00 16.80 18.20 85 82 
Total 15.00 15.80 18.70 20.30 80 78 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
Notes: “Other” estimates for 2002 exclude some employees on individual state agreements 
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Figure 4: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 























































Notes: State Individual Agreements have been omitted from this analysis due to the number of 
missing cells in that data. ‘f’ denotes female earnings under each type of employment agreement and 
‘m’ denotes male earnings. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
 
4.2.5 ASCO Group 5: Advanced clerical and service workers 
Women on AWAs in this occupational group received relatively favourable earnings 
in 2002, with relatively high earnings estimates compared with women on other 
forms of employment and with men on AWAs. However, their relative position 
eroded, so that by 2004 much of their advantage had been lost due to a fall in 
average earnings and a dramatic decline, from 108 per cent to 78 per cent, in their 
recorded earnings estimates as a percentage of men’s. Men in this group experienced 
an increase in average earnings during the same period. This is shown in Table 9 and 
Figure 5. 
 
Table 9: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 
Managerial Advanced Clerical and Service Worker Employees, May 2002 and May 2004 
 Females Males Female earnings 
as % of male 
Type of 
Agreement 
2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 % 2004 % 
Federal Collective 21.70 23.30 24.80 28.80 88 81 
State Collective 19.70 22.30 26.80 27.90 74 80 
Federal Individual 26.20 22.40 24.30 28.70 108 78 
Other 18.10 20.50 21.60 22.20 84 92 
Total 18.90 21.30 22.90 25.00 83 85 
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Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
Notes: “Other” estimates for 2002 exclude some employees on individual state agreements 
 
 
Figure 5: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 























































Notes: State Individual Agreements have been omitted from this analysis due to the number of 
missing cells in that data. ‘f’ denotes female earnings under each type of employment agreement and 
‘m’ denotes male earnings. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
4.2.6 ASCO Group 6: Intermediate clerical, sales and service 
workers 
This group of employees shows as similar pattern to that above. Women on AWAs 
experienced some earnings advantage in 2002, compared with other women and 
compared with men on AWAs. However, that position had eroded by 2004, with 
declines in both absolute and relative recorded earnings estimates. Again, men on 
AWAs experienced an increase in earnings during the same period, although their 
position relative to those on collective agreements was unfavourable.  
 
Table 10: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 
Managerial Intermediate Clerical, Sales and Service Worker Employees, May 2002 and 
May 2004 
 Females Males Female earnings 
as % of male 
Type of 
Agreement 
2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002% 2004% 
Federal Collective 18.30 19.80 20.40 21.20 90 93 
State Collective 17.90 18.90 19.70 22.00 91 86 
Federal Individual 20.00 18.70 19.00 20.40 105 92 
Other 16.30 17.30 18.90 20.20 86 86 
Total 17.00 18.10 19.30 20.70 88 87 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
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Notes: “Other” estimates for 2002 exclude some employees on individual state agreements 
 
 
Figure 6: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 






















































Notes: State Individual Agreements have been omitted from this analysis due to the number of 
missing cells in that data. ‘f’ denotes female earnings under each type of employment agreement and 
‘m’ denotes male earnings. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
 
4.2.7 ASCO Group7: Intermediate production and transport 
workers 
Women on AWAs in this occupational classification have fared relatively well, 
receiving both higher hourly earnings and earnings increases between 2002 and 
2004. They have, however, experienced relatively low increases in earnings 
compared with men on AWAs and this has resulted in a decline in AWA female 
earnings as a per cent of male’s, from 91 per cent in 2002 to 81 per cent in 2004. 
 
Table 11: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 
Managerial Intermediate Production and Transport Workers, May 2002 and May 2004 
 Females Males Female earnings 
as % of male 
Type of 
Agreement 
2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002% 2004% 
Federal Collective 15.50 16.90 21.50 22.10 72 76 
State Collective 17.60 16.60 20.90 21.30 84 78 
Federal Individual 18.50 19.80 20.30 24.40 91 81 
Other 14.80 15.30 17.50 18.60 85 82 
Total 15.30 16.40 19.20 20.30 80 81 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
Notes: “Other” estimates for 2002 exclude some employees on individual state agreements 
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Figure 7: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 






















































Notes: State Individual Agreements have been omitted from this analysis due to the number of 
missing cells in that data. ‘f’ denotes female earnings under each type of employment agreement and 
‘m’ denotes male earnings. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
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4.2.8 ASCO Group 8: Elementary clerical, sales and service workers 
In 2002, women on AWAs in this occupational group had earnings that exceeded 
those of women on other types of employment agreements and of men on all types 
of agreement. By 2004 however, this position had declined and women on AWAs 
were the lowest paid employees in this occupational group. Their position relative to 
men on AWAs had declined dramatically from 107 per cent of male AWA earnings 
to 79 per cent. 
 
Table 12: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 
Managerial Elementary, Clerical, Sales and Service Workers, May 2002 and May 2004 
 Females Males Female earnings 
as % of male 
Type of 
Agreement 
2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002% 2004% 
Federal Collective 14.30 15.80 16.30 17.30 88 91 
State Collective 15.40 15.40 17.70 17.80 87 87 
Federal Individual 18.30 14.30 17.10 18.20 107 79 
Other 14.10 15.10 16.30 16.90 87 89 
Total 14.20 15.30 16.30 17.10 87 89 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 




Figure 8: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 


























































Notes: State Individual Agreements have been omitted from this analysis due to the number of 
missing cells in that data. ‘f’ denotes female earnings under each type of employment agreement and 
‘m’ denotes male earnings. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
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4.2.9 ASCO Group 9: Labourers and related workers 
In 2002 women and men on AWAs received relatively lower hourly earnings than 
those on collective registered agreements. Their position altered little between 2002 
and 2004. In contrast to most occupational groups, women on AWAs improved 
their position relative to men and by 2004 were earning 98 per cent of estimated 
male AWA earnings. 
 
Table 13: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 
Managerial Labourer and Related Workers Employees, May 2002 and May 2004 
 Females Males Female earnings 
as % of male 
Type of 
Agreement 
2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002% 2004% 
Federal Collective 15.20 17.40 18.20 18.60 84 94 
State Collective 16.40 16.30 17.90 18.80 92 87 
Federal Individual 14.60 16.00 16.30 16.30 90 98 
Other 14.20 15.20 14.40 16.60 99 92 
Total 14.60 15.90 16.10 17.40 91 91 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
Notes: “Other” estimates for 2002 exclude some employees on individual state agreements 
 
 
Figure 9: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings ($), All Female and Male Non 




























































Notes: State Individual Agreements have been omitted from this analysis due to the number of 
missing cells in that data. ‘f’ denotes female earnings under each type of employment agreement and 
‘m’ denotes male earnings. 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
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5 Summary of Key Findings 
Earnings estimates relevant to employees with AWAs are summarised in Table 14 
and this clarifies the key findings from our investigation of disaggregated ABS data. 
While AWAs appear to be operating in a favourable manner for the earnings of 
those in managerial and administrative occupations, the story for non-managerial 
employees is quite different, particularly for women. For six of the eight occupational 
groupings shown in Table 14, average hourly ordinary time earnings for women 
declined between 2002 and 2004. This was not the case for men working under 
AWAs. 
 
The available data provide some support for the claim that larger gender pay gaps 
are associated with decentralised wage-fixing and this poses some challenges for the 
extent to which AWAs can meet goals of gender equity within the workforce and 
the community more generally.  
 
A second, perhaps more concerning aspect of these findings, however, is that 
WorkChoices, and particularly AWAs, have been promoted as an appropriate way 
of negotiating workplace level employment arrangements that allow “flexibility” in 
the way employment entitlements are structured. For example, annual leave may be 
traded for higher wages. However, a comparison of 2002 and 2004 earnings estimate 
indicates that there is little guarantee that such wage increases, once achieved, will 
be maintained through time. Thus the value of a wage increase may erode while at 
the same time, the traded benefit (such as annual) leave has been forfeited. The 2002 
and 2004 estimates used in this study suggest that not only may the real value of 
average earnings erode but that the absolute levels of average earnings has fallen 
under AWAs. 
 
Women’s Earnings and Australian Workplace Agreements                   WiSER Working Paper No. 49 
 33
Table 14: Average Hourly Ordinary Time Earnings for Non-Managerial Female and Male 
Employees with AWAs by occupation, May 2002 and May 2004 
 Females Males 
Occupational Group 2002 ($) 2004 ($) 2002 ($) 2004 ($) 
Professional 29.40 28.60 32.60 36.50 
Associate Professional 29.20 23.90 32.60 33.30 
Tradespersons and related workers 15.10 14.30 21.90 21.40 
Advanced clerical and service workers 26.20 22.40 24.30 28.70 
Intermediate clerical, sales and service 
workers 20.00 18.70 19.00 20.40 
Intermediate production and transport 
workers 18.50 19.80 20.30 24.40 
Elementary clerical, sales and service 
workers 18.30 14.30 17.10 18.20 
Labourers and related workers 14.60 16.00 16.30 16.30 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
Notes: “Other” estimates for 2002 exclude some employees on individual state agreements 
 
A third and related concern is that earnings estimates such as those used throughout 
this paper provide no insights into the entitlements that may have been traded in 
order to secure particular wage rates. For example, it is possible that those who 
record increases in earnings under the new WorkChoices provisions will do so at 
the “cost” of forfeiting previous entitlements. Currently, there is no method of 
recording the cost of a loss of entitlements against data used to generate earnings 
estimates. 
 
Figure 10 compares the gender wage ratio (common ratio of female AHOTE to male 
AHOTE) for AWAs and federally approved collective agreements over the period 
2002 to 2004.   
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Figure 10: Gender wage ratio within AWAs and Federal Collective Agreements, 2002 
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The following features of the data are worthy of comment: 
 With the exception of two occupational groups (Managers and 
Administrators and Labourers and Related Workers), the gender wage gap 
amongst non-managerial employees on AWAs deteriorated between 2002 
and 2004. 
 The gender wage gap across occupations is persistent, significant and varied.  
 In 2004, the gender wage ratio amongst non-managerial Advanced Clerical 
and Service Workers was 78 per cent. The corresponding ratios for 
Associate Professionals, Professionals and Labourers and Related Workers 
were 72, 78 and 98 per cent, respectively.  
 Relative to non-managerial employees covered by AWAs, the gender wage 
gap amongst those covered by federal collective agreements was generally 
smaller.  
 
Research elsewhere has noted that observed stability in the gender wage gap is 
underpinned by deterioration in the relative wage outcomes of men rather than by 
improvements in female pay per se (Preston 2003). Table 14 shows the relative 
earnings of different occupational groups benchmarked to Professionals and 
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disaggregated by type of agreement.  In 2002 the AHOTE for female non-managerial 
employees employed as Labourers and Related Workers and covered by an AWA 
was equal to 49.7 per cent of the corresponding rate for female non-managerial 
Professionals.  By 2004 the relativity had improved by 6.3 percentage points to 55.9 
per cent.  Amongst male Labourers and Related Workers the story was markedly 
different, with the corresponding relativity falling 5.3 percentage points from 50 per 
cent to 44.7 per cent.  In Figure 10 the observed convergence in the GWR amongst 
Labourers and Related Workers covered by AWAs is underpinned by deterioration 
in the relative pay of males.  
 
 
Table 14: Non-managerial female and male average ordinary hourly earning relativities 


















Prof 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
A/Prof 99.3 83.6 84.8 86.0 100.0 91.2 84.7 88.2 
Trades 51.4 50.0 73.6 74.3 67.2 58.6 73.7 75.5 
Adv Clerical & 
Service 89.1 78.3 80.7 85.7 74.5 78.6 80.5 89.4 
Interm. 
Cerical, Sales 
& Service 68.0 65.4 68.0 72.8 58.3 55.9 66.2 65.8 
Interm. Prod & 
Transport 62.9 69.2 57.6 62.1 62.3 66.8 69.8 68.6 
Element. 
Clerical, Sales 
& Service 62.2 50.0 53.2 58.1 52.5 49.9 52.9 53.7 
Labourers & 
Related 49.7 55.9 56.5 64.0 50.0 44.7 59.1 57.8 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue 6306.0, unpublished data 
Notes: AWA denotes AWA; CA denotes coverage of federally approved collective agreements; ‘f’ 
and ‘m’ denote female and male, respectively.   Professionals form the reference group.  




Available data demonstrate that some employees on AWAs appear to receive 
benefits in terms of increased earnings. However, the effects of AWAs vary 
markedly between occupational groups and across time. It appears that longer term 
benefits in the form of higher earnings are restricted to those in relatively favourable 
labour market positions, most notably those in administrative and managerial roles. 
Those who have traditionally been reliant on minimum award conditions to provide 
their standard employment entitlements, particularly women in non-managerial roles 
are not maintaining their earnings position. Further, it is unlikely that current data 
sources will be adequate for monitoring their position if trade offs between earnings 
and other entitlements become prevalent under the new WorkChoices 
arrangements.  
 
WorkChoices, and particularly individual agreements in the form of AWAs have been 
aggressively promoted as an appropriate way of negotiating workplace level 
employment arrangements that allow ‘flexibility’ in the way employment entitlements 
are structured. WorkChoices will also purportedly deliver increased productivity, 
increased wages and allow workers to better balance work and family life. 
 
In this paper we review evidence with respect to earning outcomes and, using new 
unpublished data from the ABS, show that notwithstanding favourable claims from 
the Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA), women are likely to be significantly 
disadvantaged in a system where primacy is given to individual bargaining. Between 
2002 and 2004 the gender wage gap amongst non-managerial employees on AWAs 
deteriorated by 19.6 percentage points to 79.6 per cent and was larger than the 
observed gender wage gap amongst non-managerial employees on collective 
(federally registered) agreements, equal to 87.5 per cent. 
 
Aside from experiencing a widening gender wage gap, the data also show that female 
non-managerial employees on AWAs also experienced a deterioration in their real 
wage between 2002 and 2004 with absolute earnings (at current prices) falling over 
the period studied. Whilst it might be that earnings have been traded off for some 
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benefit (eg annual leave), research elsewhere suggests that the employment 
conditions under most individual agreements covering non-managerial employees 
are inferior to awards (Plowman & Preston 2005). 
   
In short, available data demonstrate that some employees on AWAs appear to 
receive benefits in terms of increased earnings. However, the effects of AWAs vary 
markedly between occupational groups and across time. It appears that longer term 
benefits in the form of higher earnings are restricted to those in relatively favourable 
labour market positions, most notably those in administrative and managerial roles. 
Those who have traditionally been reliant on minimum award conditions to provide 
their standard employment entitlements, particularly women in non-managerial roles 
are not maintaining their earnings position. Further, it is unlikely that current data 
sources will be adequate for monitoring their position if trade offs between earnings 
and other entitlements become prevalent under the new WorkChoices arrangements. 
This may have significant implications for gender equity in the labour market as 
AWAs become more widely used. It is an issue that will require regular, appropriate 
data for monitoring future developments in order to encourage fairness and equity. 
 
The new workplace regulations introduced under the WorkChoices legislation gives 
a relatively privileged position to the introduction of AWAs. However, national data 
for monitoring earnings under AWAs is produced relatively infrequently and can be 
interpreted in different ways. Our paper has contrasted the “story” told by the 
unpublished data used by the Office of the Employment Advocate with the “story” 
told by alternative readings of data from the same survey. The stories vary according 
to whether the earnings managerial employees are incorporated in average earnings 
estimates, occupation group and by gender. It is clear however, that for the small 
percentage of employees on AWAs in 2002 and 2004 there were winners and 
losers, with experiences varying greatly for different market sectors. Women are 
concentrated in the market sectors that have fared badly under AWAs so far. This 
may have significant implications for gender equity in the labour market as AWAs 
become more widely used. It is an issue that will require regular, appropriate data 
for monitoring future developments in order to encourage fairness and equity. 
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